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THE PRINCIPLE OF MINIMUM LEGISLATION FOR
IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 23 OF THE BASIC LAW
0
Benny Y. T. Tai*
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region published the
Consultation Document on the Proposals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law
in September 2002. Article 23 of the Basic Law requires the Hong Kong Government
to enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition or subversion
against the Central People's Government, or the theft of state secrets. The Hong
Kong Government must also prohibit foreign political organisations or bodies from
conducting political activities in Hong Kong and prohibit political organisations or
bodies in Hong Kong from establishing ties with foreign political organisations or
bodies. A list of proposals is made in the consultation document on how to implement
Article 23. This article analyses those proposals on the basis of the principle of
minimum legislation. Though many of the proposals are acceptable, some are not
necessary or could be refined according to the principle.
Introduction
Five years after the handover of Hong Kong to China, the Government of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the Hong Kong Government)
has finally started the legislative process to implement Article 23 of the Basic
Law. According to Article 23, the Hong Kong Government must enact laws
on its own to prohibit a range of activities that include any act of treason,
secession, sedition or subversion against the Central People's Government
(CPG) and the theft of state secrets. The Government must also prohibit
foreign political organisations or bodies from conducting political activities
in Hong Kong and prohibit Hong Kong's political organisations or bodies
from establishing ties with foreign political organisations or bodies.
The Proposals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law: Consultation Docu-
ment' (the consultation document) was published in late September 2002. In
the consultation document, the Hong Kong Government puts forward a list
of proposals on how to implement Article 23 and seeks public opinion on
those proposals. The historical background and guiding principles are
* Associate Professor in Law, University of Hong Kong. The author would like to thank Carole
Petersen for her helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1 Available at http://www.info.gov.hk/sb/eng/report/reporte.pdf (hereinafter the consultation
document).
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provided in the consultation document, together with detailed suggestions
and justifications. This article analyses those proposals according to the prin-
ciple of minimum legislation. Justification is provided for why such a principle
should be followed. The desirability of the proposals included in the consul-
tation document is discussed in light of this principle.
Relevant Considerations
In the consultation document, the Government lists several guiding prin-
ciples behind the proposals. The guiding principles are relevant to how
Article 23 should be implemented, but they should not be treated as
exhaustive, especially if the matter is approached from the wider political
and constitutional context of Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong Government considers that it is very important to fulfil
the requirements of the Basic Law.2 That is, Hong Kong has a constitutional
duty to comply with Article 23, which requires that the Hong Kong Govern-
ment enact laws. No one doubts that there is such a constitutional duty.
However, is a new law necessary to fulfil this duty?3 Can existing laws be
amended? Some people go even further, and question whether it is necessary
to legislate at all to fulfil this constitutional duty.'
The Hong Kong Government also recognises that there are other require-
ments under the Basic Law that it must fulfil. The consultation document
mentions Chapter III of the Basic Law, which guarantees the fundamental
rights and duties of Hong Kong residents. Articles 27 and 39 of the Basic Law
especially are referred to in the consultation document. Article 27 guarantees
freedom of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association, of
assembly, of procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to
2 Consultation document, para 1.10. The Hong Kong Government might have chosen to initiate
the legislation at this particular time because of pressure from the PRC Government. After waiting
for five years, the PRC Government might be reluctant to wait any longer. See the view of Qiao
Xiaoyang, Deputy Secretary of the Legislative Affairs Commission, National People's Congress
Standing Committee, reported in Wenweipo, 27 Sept 2002.
Before the Hong Kong Government published the consultation document, the Hong Kong Bar
Association held the view that existing laws of Hong Kong are sufficient to prohibit the acts that
are listed in Article 23 and that there was clearly no need to create new offences or enact additional
laws. See the Position Paper of the Hong Kong Bar Association on Legislation under Article 23 of the
Basic Law, available at http://www.hkba.org/whatsnew/submission-position-papers/index.html.
The Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor shares this view. See Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor,
"Ticking Time Bomb? Article 23, Security Law, and Human Rights in Hong Kong", available at
http://www.hkhrm.org.hk/english/reports/docs/art23.rtf.
Before the Hong Kong Government published the consultation document, this was the position of
two local political parties or organisations in Hong Kong: the Democratic Party, see http://www.
dphk.org/e-site/press-release/020913a.htm and the Frontier, see http://www.frontier.org.hk/mainc/
statements/statementpdf/BasicLaw_23_ Sugguestion_020923.pdf.
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form and join trade unions and to strike. However, it has already been ob-
served' that the Basic Law itself cannot sufficiently protect the human rights
of Hong Kong residents. Fortunately, the Hong Kong Government also finds
that it has a duty to comply with Article 39, which states that the provisions
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as ap-
plied to Hong Kong will remain in force and be implemented through the
laws of Hong Kong. Therefore, in enacting any laws under Article 23, there
is a co-existing constitutional duty to comply with the international stan-
dards on the protection of the fundamental rights that are enjoyed by Hong
Kong people. However, the commitment of the Hong Kong Government to
comply with the ICCPR may not be as strong as that of the Court
of Final Appeal (CFA). 6 The Hong Kong Government is still not prepared
to state clearly that the ICCPR enjoys constitutional status in Hong Kong.
This might have affected how the Government understands the requirements
under the ICCPR. One may take a more expansive view on the protection of
human rights, or a more restrictive view, though both may still be compatible
with the ICCPR.'
Another guiding principle that is adopted by the Hong Kong Government
is to provide adequate protection to the State's essential interests, namely:
sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and national security. Again, not many
people will deny the legitimacy of these interests. However, they are all ab-
stract concepts and it is not clear how much and how far such interests should
be protected. A major concern is that very often if these interests are to be
protected, some fundamental rights and freedoms will inevitably have to be
sacrificed or at least restricted. Many will put this as a question of balancing
conflicting values: the fundamental rights of the people against the interests of
5 Yash Ghai, Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press,
2ndedn, 1999), Ch 10.
6 See HKSAR v Ng Kung-siu and Another [1999] 3 HKLRD 907, 920, where the CFA stated that "the
ICCPR is incorporated into the Basic Law by its Article 39".
7 Consultation document, para 1.2. However, the CFA might have softened its position in two re-
cent decisions. Shum Kwok Sher v HKSAR, unrep., FACC No 1 of 2002, 10 July 2002 and Gurung
Kesh Bahadur v Director of Immigration, unrep., FACV No 17 of 2001, 30 July 2002. The CFA now
states that "the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance provides for the incorporation into the laws of
Hong Kong of the provisions of the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong. The incorporated provisions
are contained in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights...". It is not clear whether the ICCPR still enjoys a
constitutional status through Art 39 of the Basic Law or a more indirect and non-constitutional
legal status through incorporation into the laws of Hong Kong by the Hong Kong Bill of Rights
Ordinance in accordance with Art 39.
8 This is reflected in a note in the consultation document which states that the Siracusa Principles
on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR and the Johannesburg Principles on
National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, the two sets of Principles
that provide more expansive protection of human rights, are not yet widely accepted. This may
indicate that the Hong Kong Government does not want to adopt a more expansive view of human
rights protection.
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the State. It appears from the consultation document that the Hong Kong
Government is determined to avoid any infringement of the fundamental rights
and freedoms that are protected under the Basic Law and the ICCPR. In such
conflicts, the Government will try to find an arrangement so that the limita-
tion on the rights will not constitute an infringement on those rights, but will
be within justifiable restrictions. Even so, that may not be sufficient. As stated
above, there will not be one solution or one point of balance alone in this
exercise. A question that demands more careful study is how to choose from
the available options, which may all be compatible with the ICCPR. The ICCPR
only sets the lowest requirement on the protection of human rights. Is the at-
tainment of the lowest requirement in Hong Kong acceptable, or can more be
expected? The Government has not explicitly indicated its preference.
The last guiding principle that is adopted by the Hong Kong Government
is to ensure that the laws enacted are clearly and tightly defined to avoid
uncertainty. Legal certainty is one of the criteria of the rule of law.9 Moreover,
under human rights jurisprudence, all laws that impose limitations on indi-
vidual rights have to be clear enough to make the scope of constraint that
will be imposed on the people reasonably foreseeable.'o The issue of legal
certainty is relevant when considering whether to legislate under Article 23,
whether by way of amendment to the existing laws or through the creation of
new offences. If no law is to be enacted, then the problem of the legal uncer-
tainty that is created by existing laws is encountered. Under existing laws,
the offences of treason are totally inappropriate, especially because they cover
many offences against the sovereign as a natural person. Even though the
Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap 1) provides a formula of
legal adoption to allow such provisions to be maintained after the transfer of
sovereignty," there is still too much uncertainty in the scope and objectives
of those provisions.12 Failing to legislate to clarify some of the difficult and
vague concepts under the existing laws may threaten the rule of law.
Other than these expressly stated guiding principles, the Hong Kong
Government has been influenced by further considerations. In many places
in the consultation document, the Government refers to the practices of other
countries in how they deal with crimes against the State. It seems that the
9 Geoffrey Walker, The Rule of Law: Foundation of Constitutional Democracy (Carlton, Vic: Melbourne
University Press, 1988), Ch 1.
1o See The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245, p 271, para 49.
1 Section 6 of the Reunification Ordinance is amended the Interpretation and General Clauses
Ordinance (Cap 1) by adding a new schedule (Schedule 8) concerning construction after the transfer
of sovereignty of words and expressions in laws previously in force in Hong Kong.
12 Another uncertainty is whether the existing treason offence in the Crimes Ordinance can cover
secession. It has been argued that s 2(1)(c)(i) can be interpreted to cover the secession offence, but
this is doubted. (See the consultation document, para 3.2 and fn 23.)
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Hong Kong Government would like to give an impression that all of the
proposals in the consultation document are consistent with the practices of
many States, especially some Western liberal States." Although the propos-
als may be similar to what can be found in many Western liberal States, specific
laws cannot be considered outside of their political and constitutional context.
Some major differences exist between Hong Kong and those States. First,
Hong Kong does not have a democratic system of elections. The Western
liberal States have such democratic systems to provide additional balancing
forces to ensure that their governments do not use their powers in suppressive
ways. The experience in many Asian States shows that these laws can easily
be abused in States with no democracy.
Second, the Hong Kong Government is not accountable to the people
of Hong Kong through the electoral system or other constitutional systems
(eg there are no effective checks and balances between the legislature and
the executive authorities)." Third, the human rights protection system is
not well entrenched and does not provide constitutionally secure guarantees
to the people of Hong Kong." It is very naive in a constitutional sense if
no attention is given to the relevant constitutional practices in Western lib-
eral States. Many Western liberal countries have allowed such practices to
lapse into disuse and have not prosecuted any person under the relevant laws
13 See reference to the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 49: Crimes Against the State
(1986) in the consultation document, paras 1.4 and 2.16. House of Lords decisions are also quoted
(paras 2.16 and 6.24) and a working paper of the English Law Commission, Working Paper No 72:
Codification of the Criminal Law: Treason, Sedition and Allied Offence (1977) is used to support a
proposal (para 2.16). The Australian Committee on Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law,
Fifth Interim Report (1991) is cited (para 2.16). A decision of the Supreme Court of Canada is used
to illustrate a point (para 3.2) and reference is also made to the relevant provisions in the French
Penal Code (para 3.3), the German Penal Code (paras 3.3 and 5.2), the Canadian Criminal Code
(para 5.2) and the Australian Crimes Act (para 5.2).
14 See Benny Tai, "The Development of Constitutionalism in Hong Kong", in Raymond Wacks (ed),
The New Legal Order in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999).
1 In HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu and Another (n 6 above), the CFA assumed that the ICCPR enjoys a
constitutional status through Art 39 of the Basic Law without any discussion on the legal effect of
the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Treatment of
the Laws Previously in Force in Hong Kong in accordance with Art 160 of the Basic Law of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China adopted by the Standing
Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress at its 24th session on 23 Feb 1997. This
decision repealed ss 2(3), 3 and 4 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383). It shows
clearly that the PRC Government wanted to take away any superior legal status enjoyed by the
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (if any) and the ICCPR before the transfer of sovereignty.
How this decision will affect the constitutional status of the ICCPR and the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights Ordinance now that sovereignty has been transferred is unclear. There is always a possibility
that the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress may give an interpretation of
Article 39 itself and clarify the meaning and impact of this decision. If the Standing Committee
was to make an interpretation that this decision reflects its intention of not agreeing to a constitu-
tional status for ICCPR, the decision of the CFA on the staus of the ICCPR would have to be
overruled.
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for a long time. 6 There may be all kinds of reasons for not repealing these
laws,' but in any serious study constitutional conventions or practices are as
important as, or even more important than, the text of the statutes.'"
One other implied principle that is applied by the Hong Kong Govern-
ment in the consultation document is the use of common law rules and
concepts to support the proposals." Indeed, this is the correct approach, as
Hong Kong has a common law legal system.20 However, all common law
rules and concepts should not be indiscriminately accepted. The background
and evolution of each of the rules and concepts must be understood. Like
statutory offences, these common law rules and concepts also have to be read
within their specific political and constitutional context.1
Retaining the existing laws as far as possible seems to be another hidden
principle, although the Government does explain why the laws would be
retained in some of the proposals. Extreme care must be taken when deciding
to retain certain existing laws, especially if those laws were borrowed from a
very different constitutional order or were made hundreds of years ago. All
such laws must be scrutinised according to the specific political and constitu-
tional context of Hong Kong.
There are other relevant considerations in the evaluation of the proposals
to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law. They are drawn from the specific
political and constitutional context of Hong Kong, and it seems that they
might not have been fully considered by the Government. These additional
considerations interact with the express and implied guiding principles adopted
by the Government. They provide a more complete picture to guide the strat-
egy to implement Article 23 in Hong Kong.
One such consideration is the imminence of legislating to implement
Article 23. Even if it is accepted that there is a duty to legislate under Article 23,
now may not be the time to do it. One argument is that there is no immediate
16 Hualing Fu, "The National Security Factor: Putting Article 23 of the Basic Law in Perspective", in
Steve Tsang (ed), Judicial Independence and Rule of Law in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 2001).
1 The Law Reform Commission of Canada has argued that the existing laws on crimes against the
State in Canada are out of date, and that they should be updated to adjust to changes in the under-
lying values of these offences. See Working Paper 49: Crimes Against the State (n 13 above).
18 Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (London: University of London Press, 5th edn, 1964),
Ch III.
19 See the consultation document, paras 2.7, 2.10, 2.13, 2.16, 3.11, 3.124.11, 4.21 and 6.24.
20 Arts 8, 81 and 84 of the Basic Law.
21 Consultation document, para 2.7. The Hong Kong Government proposes to keep the term "levy-
ing war" in the treason offence and seems to support the continued application of the common law
meaning of that phrase in the new legislation. However, that phrase originated in an English stat-
ute that was enacted in the 14th century and English courts developed the common law meaning
in the 19th century. The Law Reform Commission of Canada in its Working Paper 49: Crimes
Against the State (n 13 above) argued that the phrase has an old-fashioned ring to it and is used in an
unfamiliar sense.
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threat to the State's interests in Hong Kong and therefore there is no need to
legislate now. However, others emphasise the urgency of the matter and that
there should be no more delay." This consideration is relevant not only to the
decision about whether any enactment is needed; it is also relevant when con-
sidering the extent of legislation under Article 23. If there is no imminent
danger that national security will be threatened in Hong Kong, then it is more
difficult to justify more stringent legal measures. Those who put forward such
proposals carry a much heavier burden of justification.
Another consideration is the nature of all the so-called crimes against the
State. Inevitably, the definitions of such crimes have to be phrased in a man-
ner that is comparatively vague and tends to be restrictive of individual rights
and freedoms. The scope of the powers that are enjoyed by the government is
usually wide and the powers are also subject to fewer checks because the
government may need the powers to deal with emergency situations or situa-
tions that threaten the continuation of the existing constitutional order.
Political controversies arise whenever these laws have to be put into use.
There is always a concern that the government will be tempted to use the
wide powers that are granted under this kind of law to suppress political
opposition, and history shows that this concern is not without grounds. The
same concern exists in Hong Kong.23 Recently, three local political activists
were prosecuted for helping to organise an unauthorised assembly. The as-
sembly was unauthorised because the activists failed to comply with the
requirement under the Public Order Ordinance" to obtain a notice of no
objection from the Commissioner of Police before organising a procession.
Since the transfer of sovereignty in 1997, there have been 527 public proces-
sions organised without such a notice of no objection." The judge stated that
this was a case that was political in nature.26 His comment could be under-
stood as a criticism of the Government for prosecuting the organisers of the
22 See Qiao Xiaoyang (n 2 above).
23 One example from the 1950s is Fei Yi-ming v R (1952) 36 HKLR 133. The proprietor and publisher,
the printer and the editor of Ta Kung Pao were prosecuted and convicted for publishing a seditious
publication concerning the colonial government. The publication included a report of a commen-
tary by Peking's People's Daily accusing the colonial government of prosecuting some Chinese
inhabitants who were active union members. Since the enactment of the Public Order Ordinance
(Cap 245) in 1967, the colonial government had used the various public order offences to suppress
political opposition, especially during the 1970s. There was some relaxation in the 1980s and the
early 1990s, but since the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was established in 1997
it seems that the Government has reactivated the use of public law offences to deal with political
opposition.
24 Section 13, Public Order Ordinance.
25 Mingpao, 26 Nov 2002 and the homepage of the Hong Kong Police, available at http://www.info.
gov.hk/police/aa-home/english/statistics/statsframe.htm.
26 Unrep., Kowloon City Magistrates' Courts No 8456 of 2002. See also "Activists are found guilty
over illegal rally", South China Morning Post, 26 Nov 2002.
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public procession for political reasons, because they were prosecuted while
the organisers in all the other "unlawful" public processions were not. However,
the judge still had to convict the accused because they had breached the law.
This case clearly shows that laws could be used by the Hong Kong Govern-
ment to put pressure on or even suppress political opposition. If public order
laws can be so used, the Hong Kong Government can manipulate the laws
prohibiting crimes against the State even more easily because these laws will
give the Government even more discretionary powers.27
A related consideration is how much trust the people of Hong Kong
have in the Government. All of the laws made to implement Article 23 will
have to be implemented and enforced. The question is how the Hong Kong
Government will treat the laws. Will it only take these laws as dead letter
laws, as do many Western liberal States? Alternatively, will the Government
use the laws widely to suppress all opposition within the territory? From
many surveys that have been conducted since the transfer of sovereignty, it
seems that the people of Hong Kong are placing less and less trust in the
Chief Executive and the Government.28 There is a need to be sensitive to
this distrust when formulating any legislative schemes to implement Article 23.
The situation in Hong Kong is further complicated by the fact that the
Government is only an autonomous government of a special region of China.
There is always a possibility that the Sovereign in Beijing might interfere in
these matters, especially as they all involve the State's interests. Hong Kong
enjoys a high degree of autonomy under the Basic Law, 29 but this autonomy
has been described as only "autonomy under supervision".30 The provisions of
the Basic Law reflect the potential supervisory role of the CPG in Hong Kong.31
The fact that in the last five years the CPG has not used its supervisory
powers widely does not mean that it will not do so in the future.32 This is the
greatest concern of many Hong Kong people in relation to any new legislation.
They fear that the Hong Kong Government might in the future be subject to
pressure from Beijing, and have to enforce the laws in a suppressive manner.
27 Two other political activists, Lau San Ching and To Kwan Hang, were recently arrested on a similar
ground for organising a public procession without obtaining a notice of no objection in accordance
with s 13 of the Public Order Ordinance.
28 See the opinion survey that was conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies,
Chinese University of Hong Kong. The score that reflected the level of trust the people of Hong
Kong have in the Chief Executive dropped from 61.8 in July 1997 to 46.3 in September 2002. 50 is
the passing score (see http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ipro/020923.htm).
29 Arts 2 and 12 of the Basic Law.
30 Zhang Youyu, "The Reasons for and Basic Principles in Formulating the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region Basic Law, and its Essential Contents and Mode of Expression" (1988) 2 Journal
of Chinese Law 5.
31 Examples are Arts 17, 18, 158 and 159 of the Basic Law.
32 Benny Y. T. Tai, "Chapter One of Hong Kong's New Constitution: Constitutional Positioning and
Repositioning", in Ming Chan and Alvin Y. So (ed), Crisis and Transformation in China's Hong Kong
(London: M. E. Sharpe, 2002).
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This concern must be taken into consideration in devising any legislative
scheme to implement Article 23.
One method to maintain the autonomy of Hong Kong is to ensure the
separation of the legal systems of Hong Kong and the Mainland. The CPG's
decision not to legislate directly for Hong Kong on Article 23 offences shows
that the autonomy enjoyed by Hong Kong is built on the separation of the
two legal systems. If that is the intention of the Basic Law, then it should be
respected in fulfilling the constitutional duty to legislate under Article 23.
Judicial independence and judicial autonomy are also relevant consider-
ations in the wider political and constitutional context. Some people argue
that even though the laws enacted under Article 23 will inevitably be vague
and subject to different interpretations, and could be very suppressive, Hong
Kong still has an independent judiciary which will apply those laws indepen-
dently and fairly. Some people may rely on this to assert that people need not
worry about the enactment of the laws, as they will be implemented fairly by
the courts of Hong Kong. It may be correct that judicial independence is
constitutionally guaranteed" and practised, 4 but the fact cannot be ignored
that judicial independence in Hong Kong must still be exercised within the
constraints of Hong Kong's judicial autonomy. The judicial autonomy of the
courts of Hong Kong has already been challenged seriously, in particular when
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress re-interpreted
the Basic Law in 1999. 3
Some of the considerations discussed above conflict with one another.
Trying to balance them may not be an easy task. Nonetheless, the weighting
to be given to each of the considerations must be determined before the pro-
posals in the consultation document can be implemented.
The Principle of Minimum Legislation
The principle of minimal legislation is the result of an attempt to balance all
of the considerations mentioned above. It is based on a weighting scale that
has been developed by taking into account what are submitted to be the true
3 Arts 2, 19 and 85 of the Basic Law.
34 Benny Y. T. Tai, "The Development of Constitutionalism in Hong Kong", in Raymond Wacks
(ed), The New Legal Order in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999).
3 See Tai (n 32 above). There is one more consideration from the Basic Law and it is the exclusion of
the jurisdiction of HKSAR courts over acts of state under Art 19 of the Basic Law. The exact scope
and manner of the operation of this rule is not clear, as it depends on how Hong Kong courts, the
Hong Kong Government and the Central Authorities will interpret and apply the concept of
an "act of state". See Benny Y. T. Tai, "The Jurisdiction of the Courts of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region", in Alice Lee (ed), Law Lectures for Practitioners 1998 (Hong Kong: Hong
Kong Law Journal Ltd, 1998).
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ends of constitutional government. 6 As will be illustrated, this principle
borrows heavily from liberal constitutionalism, the rule of law and human
rights laws, but one would find that this principle in some circumstances might
set standards that are even higher than its sources. However, the principle
put forward is not intended to be a general and comprehensive constitutional
doctrine. Rather, it is proposed as a means of dealing with particular types of
legislative measures" concerning crimes against the State, within the special
political and constitutional context of Hong Kong."
In simple terms, the principle of minimum legislation is to legislate as
little as possible in fulfilling Hong Kong's constitutional duty to implement
Article 23. The minimising requirement of the principle has several elements.
First, the option that fulfils the constitutional duty under Article 23 with the
least legislative measures should be adopted. Second, if there is an option
that will impose less restriction on individual rights than another, although
both may be compatible with the ICCPR as justifiable restrictions, the one
that imposes lesser restrictions should be adopted. Third, if the existing laws
are clear enough and are compatible with the protection of individual rights
and freedoms as stated in the second sense of the principle of minimum
legislation, then there is no need to enact new laws. Fourth, all of the legal
terms should be defined as clearly as possible to minimise the discretion granted
to the law enforcement agencies. Fifth, the number of legislative authorities
that can legislate directly or indirectly for the matters that are covered by
Article 23 should be kept to a minimum. In fact, that power should be lim-
ited to the legislative authority of Hong Kong alone. Proposals that would
allow a legislative authority other than the legislative authority of Hong Kong
to enact laws for Hong Kong, even indirectly, should be avoided.
The principle presumes the need to enact new laws to implement
Article 23. Much weight is given to legal certainty in the balancing exercise.
It is submitted that a clear law is better than a vague law even though the
clear law may be more restrictive. This is because a vague law could allow
36 To summarise, the ultimate goal of a constitutional government is to protect the individual rights
and freedoms of its population. A constitutional government has the following features. First, the
government must only exercise those powers authorised by the constitution and the law in the
manner so provided by them. Second, the constitution separates, balances and checks the powers
of various branches of government, including the executive, legislative and judicial authorities.
Third, the constitution establishes a democratic electoral system by periodically empowering the
population to choose representatives to run their government, the leaders of which are accordingly
accountable to the people. Fourth, the constitution has an in-built human rights protection system,
which interacts with other constitutional arrangements to achieve the ultimate goal of the
constitution.
3 The principle may not be applicable to other laws because in appropriate situations we may expect
the government to devise more comprehensive legislative schemes of regulation, not only mini-
mum measures. One example is the law on social welfare.
38 There may be other principles more appropriate to guide legislative measures in other constitutional
systems. See the law reform papers in England, Canada and Australia referred to in n 13 above.
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more threats of abuse. Indeed, the existing laws are so vague that if legislation
is not adopted to clarify the concepts, then individual rights may be subject
to even more threats.39
It is therefore important for Hong Kong to legislate in regard to Article 23
in order to fulfil its constitutional duty, and to do so is also compatible with
the rule of law. That there is no imminent danger in Hong Kong for such
legislation" may not be a strong enough argument to outweigh this duty,
especially if one takes into consideration the requirement of legal certainty.
However, this constitutional duty need not be fulfilled more than is necessary,
especially because individual rights and freedoms must not be compromised.
It is good that the Hong Kong Government's proposals recognise the prin-
ciple that all limitations on individual rights and freedoms must be justifiable
restrictions under the ICCPR, but this is not sufficient. One may argue that
the Government has already promised that the proposals in the consultation
document will be compatible with the ICCPR. According to the ICCPR,
any limitation on fundamental rights will be scrutinised according to a well-
accepted principle of proportionality, and that would already provide sufficient
protection to the human rights of Hong Kong people." The principle of pro-
portionality42 does not require the least restriction on a fundamental right,
but only that the means used to restrict a right must be proportionate to the
legitimate aim justifying that restriction. Laws are not like computer data,
which can be 100 per cent accurate, and more than one legal measure can
satisfy the requirement of proportionality. While national security is one of
the justifiable grounds to restrict human rights, the meaning of national secu-
rity is not very clear. There may be many available options in limiting a human
right that are all proportionate limitations, though some may comparatively
impose more restriction and some impose less.
From the special political and constitutional context of Hong Kong,
however, the Hong Kong Government should not be allowed to choose among
3 See p 582 above.
40 See p 585 above.
41 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 and The Sunday limes v United Kingdom (1979) 2
EHRR 245.
42 See Yash Ghai, "Derogations and Limitations in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights", in Johannes Chan
and Yash Ghai (eds), The Hong Kong Bill of Rights: A Comparative Approach (Hong Kong: Butterworths
Asia, 1993), p 19.
43 The Hong Kong Government has commissioned a leading human rights lawyer in the United
Kingdom, David Pannick QC, to provide an opinion on the compatibility of the proposals in the
consultation document with human rights law (see http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr02-03/english/pan-
els/se/papers/ajlssecb2-375-le.pdf. David Pannick held the view that the proposals are consistent
with human rights law. In his opinion David Pannick emphasised that there should be a fair bal-
ance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the
protection of individuals' fundamental rights. This fair balance principle is just the principle of
proportionality in another form. It is argued that the fair balance principle or the principle of
proportionality cannot provide sufficient protection to the rights of Hong Kong people against any
law made to implement Art 23.
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all these proportionate limitations, but should choose the restriction that
imposes the least limitation. There are three reasons for preferring the prin-
ciple of minimum legislation to the principle of proportionality in determining
the justifiable restriction on human rights. First, Hong Kong does not have a
firmly entrenched bill of rights.44 Second, the Hong Kong courts may adopt
a more conservative approach in interpreting the extent of the rights to
be enjoyed by Hong Kong people when it is under pressure."5 Third, the
record of the Hong Kong Government shows that its conception of human
rights protection is rather distorted, in that it will only tolerate the rights
of the population on the condition that they will not threaten the order of
society.46 Rights are not considered to be fundamental, but just things to be
balanced with many other interests which the Government considers to be
important. The Hong Kong Government and the courts of Hong Kong tend
to give more weight to these other interests.47
There is no argument about the State's interest being given a primary
concern, but the question is how far such interests should be protected. Indi-
vidual rights and freedoms should not be put on the same level as national
security. Rights are fundamental and there must be clear justification be-
fore a right can be restricted. National security or all of the State's interests
are accordingly given such weight.
Although common law, existing laws and laws in democratic States may
provide support for some of the proposals, they must be considered within
their specific constitutional and political contexts, which are very different
from those in Hong Kong under the new constitutional order and in the new
millennium. Much weight has been given to the fact that Hong Kong has an
imperfect constitutional system. Hong Kong's undemocratic political system,
the weak accountability of the Government to the people of Hong Kong49
and the uncertain status of Hong Kong's bill of rights together give Hong
Kong people rather weak constitutional protection of their human rights. '
Therefore, even if harsher laws can be justified in other jurisdictions, Hong
Kong cannot afford similar laws. The powers of the Government under the
laws must be subject to stricter limitations than in other countries to minimise
any possible chance of abuse. If not, then the rights and freedoms of Hong
Kong people will be laid on an even weaker foundation.
44 See n 15 above.
45 See the analysis of HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu and Another (n 6 above) in Tai (n 32 above).
46 See the "Chief Executive's statement on 50th Anniversary of Human Rights Declaration", 10 Dec
1998.
4 HKSAR v Ng Kung Siu and Another (n 6 above).
48 The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (n 41 above).
49 See p 583 above.
50 See n 15 above.
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Hong Kong's judicial independence may balance people's concerns about
potential abuse by the Government." However, the potential threat to Hong
Kong's judicial autonomy is still a factor that counts very much against legis-
lation under Article 23. Unfortunately, the power of the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress to interpret the Basic Law is something
that cannot be removed from Hong Kong's constitutional system. By separat-
ing the two legal systems as far as possible, Hong Kong may be able to minimise
interference from Beijing.
As one can see, the justification for the principle of minimum legislation
is the practical 2 and contextualised" considerations in Hong Kong. Clear
discrepancies can be found in the Hong Kong constitutional system from the
ideal of a constitutional government. To ensure that the fundamental rights
of Hong Kong people can still be sufficiently protected, the standard and
strategy that should be adopted in this legislative exercise to implement Ar-
ticle 23 must be adjusted accordingly. People may disagree with the weighting
that is given to each of the considerations 54 but it is submitted that the prin-
ciple of minimum legislation is built on rational grounds.
51 See p 587 above.
52 The principle is developed on the basis of a practical consideration that there is nothing one can do
in Hong Kong to prevent the Hong Kong Government from legislating Art 23 as it dominates the
Legislative Council. It may not be very worthwhile at this stage to continue to be entangled in the
issue of whether laws need to be legislated to implement Art 23. What is more constructive is to
convince the Hong Kong Govemment to adopt the more expansive view of human rights protec-
tion in this legislative exercise. However, one has to be careful in developing one's arguments. Even
if the Hong Kong Government would like to accept a less stringent suggestion in principle, it still
needs to justify its acceptance of the suggestion. The Hong Kong Government has to be accountable
to the Central Authorities on this matter. Therefore, arguments for a suggestion have to be made in
a way that will provide justification for the Hong Kong Government for accepting it. The principle
of minimum legislation, especially the first element (legislating just to the extent to satisfy the mini-
mum requirements of Art 23) can at least be presented to be less political and controversial than
directly asserting the expansive requirements of human rights or bluntly showing one's distrust of the
Hong Kong Government and the Central Authorities.
5 The principle of minimum legislation allows the Hong Kong Government to consider the matters
from a wider political and constitutional context. The consideration of how to regain the trust of
the Hong Kong people is missed in the consultation document. Hong Kong is currently experienc-
ing economic difficulties. Regaining the trust of the Hong Kong people will be very important to
the Government in the coming five years. Whether the Government can smoothly carry out its
policies to bring economic prosperity back to Hong Kong depends on whether it has the trust and
support of its people. If the Government adopts the principle of minimum legislation to guide its
legislation to implement Art 23, this comparatively neutral and less controversial principle should
be able to satisfy the Central Authorities as well as regain the trust of the Hong Kong people.
54 In the enactment of the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Ordinance, the Secretary for
Security had adopted a similar "minimalist approach" and agreed that any increase in enforcement
powers must be strictly in accordance with the need to ensure public safety. See the speech of the
Secretary for Security in the second reading of the bill, available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrOl-
02/english/counmtg/hansard/cmO4l7ti-translate-e.pdf. However, the question of what a government
official considers to be minimum may not be the same as what other citizens consider to be minimum.
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Application of the Principle
In this section, the proposals in the Government's consultation document
are examined as to their compatibility with the principle of minimum
legislation.
Treason
Treason is a concept that involves the betrayal of one's country in collabora-
tion with an external enemy threatening the existing constitutional order."
The Hong Kong Government proposes" that all the offences against the
person of the sovereign or head of state under the existing laws" should be
deleted. The offences are inherited from the colonial constitutional order,
under which the sovereign was the head of state, ie the Queen of the United
Kingdom. However, under the new constitutional order, the sovereign is no
longer the head of state, ie the President of the People's Republic of China. It
is no longer appropriate to provide special protection to the head of state as a
person. The deletion of the offences is compatible with the principle of mini-
mum legislation because the provisions are not essential components of an
offence of treason.
The consultation document suggests that a person commits treason if
he or she levies war by joining forces with a foreigner with the intent to
overthrow the PRC Government, compels the PRC Government by force
or constraint to change its policies or measures, puts any force or constraint
upon the PRC Government or intimidates or overawes the PRC Government.
The consultation document suggests that the common law meaning of levy-
ing war should be applied; this includes a riot or insurrection involving a
considerable number of people for some general public purpose, but does not
include an uprising for a limited, local or private purpose." One difference
with the existing legal provision" is that in the new provision the person
must join forces with a foreigner in levying war. The Hong Kong Govern-
ment has studied laws of the Mainland and overseas jurisdictions and found
that treason usually involves the betrayal of one's country in collaboration
with an external enemy. On that basis, it is proposed that "joining forces with
a foreigner" be added. In the proposal concerning treason by instigating a
foreigner to invade the country, the consultation document defines a for-
eigner as armed forces which are under the direction and control of a foreign
government or which are not based in the PRC.60 Presumably, this definition
5 Consultation document, paras 2.4 and 2.5.
56 Ibid., para 2.6.
5 Sections 2(1)(a), 2(1)(b) and 5, Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200).
58 Consultation document, para 2.7.
59 Section 2(1)(c), Crimes Ordinance.
60 Consultation document, para 2.9.
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should also be applicable to treason by levying war. Hence, the person must
be joining forces with an armed force outside the PRC and not merely joining
forces with an individual foreigner.
Another difference in the proposed offence is that the act of levying war
must be accompanied by one of four specific intentions, while the existing
laws are not clear as to what intention the person must have to commit trea-
son (other than the intention to dispose the sovereign). By rephrasing the
wording of the existing laws, the intention element is clarified.
At first sight, the proposal is compatible with the principle of minimum
legislation. Common law concepts are used to define legal terms, experiences
in other jurisdictions, especially in democratic States, are considered and le-
gal requirements are clarified. However, the phrase "levying war" originated
in an English statute that was enacted in the 14th century61 and the common
law meaning was developed by English courts in the 19th century.62 It has
been argued that the phrase has an old-fashioned ring to it and is used in an
unfamiliar sense. By adding the requirement that the person must levy war
by joining forces with a foreigner, the common law meaning may not cover
situations of internal disorder. To clarify the phrase and avoid doubt, a sug-
gestion made by the Canadian Law Reform Commission to change "levying
war" to "engaging in war" could be adopted."
The proposal includes four kinds of intention, at least one of which must
accompany the act of levying war in order for an act to be seen as treason.
The first, which is similar to existing laws, is the intent to overthrow the PRC
Government." The wording of the other three intentions are all borrowed
-from existing laws, but they have been adapted to read as intentions rather
than as consequences. This change appears to be an attempt by the Govern-
ment to confine the scope of the existing laws, which' is in accord with the
principle of minimum legislation. However, the intention to support the crimi-
nal act of treason should be further refined. The intention to put any force or
constraint upon the PRC Government is inherited from the colonial order,
when the sovereign was a natural person. It seems unnatural that force or
constraint can be put upon a government. As argued, all offences linked with
the sovereign as a person should be deleted, and so this intention should
also be deleted. Moreover, the intention to intimidate or overawe the PRC
Government overlaps with the intention to compel the PRC Government
by force or constraint to change its policies or measures. According to the
principle of minimum legislation, legislation should be minimised as much
61 UK Statute of Treasons 1351.
62 Rv Dowling (1848) 7 St Tr (NS) 381, p 460 and Rv Gallagher (1883) 15 Cox CC 291.
63 The Law Reform Commission of Canada (n 13 above), p 3 5 .
64 See ibid., pp 46-47.
65 Section 2(1)(c)(i), Crimes Ordinance.
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as possible and overlaps should be avoided. Therefore, the remaining two
intentions should not be included.
The existing laws66 include a treason offence if a person instigates any
foreigner to invade the country. It is proposed to keep this offence, but to
clarify the meaning of "foreigner"."7 Clarifying a legal term is certainly re-
quired by the principle of minimum legislation, as this will minimise the
discretion of the law enforcement agencies. However, the meaning of "insti-
gate" is not clear. The Chinese translation of "instigate" in the consultation
document is "0J ", which may have a different or wider meaning than
"instigate" in English. The key to instigating something is to bring about or to
cause it to happen. However, the Chinese translation may include mere speech
or acts of persuasion. Moreover, the causation and consequence factors are
not clearly specified in the Chinese translation. A person may make a speech
that may cause people to believe that he is inviting foreign forces to invade
the country. But if an invasion does not occur as a result of the speech, or if
the speech does not cause any invasion by foreign forces, should the person
be punished for treason? Unless the factors of causation and consequences
are clearly spelt out, the proposal should not be accepted. Even though there
are existing laws in this area, the provision would be inconsistent with the
principle of minimum legislation because the offence is not clearly defined
(at least in the Chinese translation) and too much restriction is imposed on
freedom of speech.
The consultation document proposes that the treason offence of assisting
any public enemy who is at war with the PRC be retained.68 Under common
law, a public enemy is someone whose country is in a state of war with one's
country. The state of war may be formally declared or may consist of armed
conflicts to which sufficient publicity has been given, ie open hostility. Assis-
tance means any act done to strengthen the enemy or weaken one's country
to resist the enemy.69 The consultation document also suggests codifying
these common law positions. As the act is generally recognised as a form
of treason, the retention and codification of this offence are compatible with
the principle of minimum legislation.
The consultation document proposes to codify the common law offence
of misprision of treason. It is suggested that if anyone fails to take reasonable
steps within a reasonable time to inform the police of the fact that another
person has committed treason, they are also liable. This would clearly contra-
vene the principle of minimum legislation. Article 23 only requires Hong
Kong to enact laws to prohibit treason. Misprision of treason is not treason
66 Section 2(1)(d), Crimes Ordinance.
67 Consultation document, para 2.9.
68 Section 2(1)(e), Crimes Ordinance.
69 Consultation document, para 2.10.
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itself. By codifying misprision of treason, people who should not be included
in the legislation that will implement Article 23 will be included. In addition,
this will place a positive duty on everyone to report any act of treason. This
may be against the general principles of criminal law and may infringe indi-
vidual rights, or at least restrict individual freedoms more than necessary to
protect the State from treason. If a person acts in a manner that may in some
way assist a person who has committed treason, then he or she could be pun-
ishable under the inchoate and accomplice offences of the treason offence.70
Therefore, the common law offence of misprision of treason should simply be
abolished.
Secession
No existing law in Hong Kong covers secession. Secessionist activities
are not universally considered to be an offence. In some countries, there is
a constitutional right for a part of the territory to secede from the country.71
As the consultation document correctly points out, laws on secession in indi-
vidual countries are determined by the history and special circumstances of
the country in question. Many Chinese hold the traditional belief that the
unity of China brings prosperity and separation brings disorder. China's his-
torical background may justify the view that secessionist activities should be
discouraged. However, Hong Kong is a modern society. Any restrictions on
individual freedoms that are justified only by the beliefs of ancestors must be
strictly scrutinised.
The consultation document proposes to create a new offence to prohibit
acts of secession to fulfil the constitutional duty of Article 23.72 However,
the description of the offence is very unclear. The consultation document
proposes that if a person, by levying war, use of force, threat of force or other
unlawful means, withdraws a part of the PRC from its sovereignty or resists
the CPG in its exercise of sovereignty over a part of China, he or she will be
liable for the secession offence. Unlike treason, the act is not limited to levy-
ing war, but the point made above on "levying war" also applies here." Mere
"use of force" casts the net too wide and contradicts the principle that the
Hong Kong Government itself has relied upon. The inclusion of "serious un-
lawful means" at least shows that a certain degree of seriousness has to be
involved. The mere use of force without any requirement as to scale or degree
will not be compatible with the principle of minimum legislation. By the
same reasoning, the threat of force should also not be accepted. Threat of
force could also be rejected on the ground that by its very nature it is different
70 Ibid., para 2.13. See p 610 below.
71 One example is the autonomous arrangement between the Cook Islands and New Zealand.
72 Consultation document, para 3.6.
7 See p 592 above.
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from the other acts. All the other acts are concrete acts rather than threats to
act. If the act rises to the level of an attempt, then the act could be covered by
the inchoate or accomplice offences of the substantial offence." As illus-
trated in the previous discussion concerning instigation, the criminalisation
of a mere threat (without any additional requirement of causation and
consequence) arguably casts the net too wide."
The last act is serious unlawful means. The consultation document con-
fines the term to serious violence against a person, serious damage to property,
endangering a person's life, creating a serious risk to the health or safety of
the public or a section of the public, serious interference with or disruption of
an electronic system or serious interference with or disruption of an essential
service, facility or system, whether public or private.76 The first aspect of
serious unlawful means, which requires serious violence against a person, dem-
onstrates the point that has been made that the mere use of force should not
be sufficient to attract liability. The other aspects seem to be reasonable, ex-
cept for serious interference with or disruption of an electronic system. There
is no description as to the type of electronic system, unlike the following
aspect which emphasises the essential nature of the service, facility or system.
This would be more acceptable if the proposal was limited to electronic sys-
tems that are linked with or that manage an essential service, facility or system.
However, this would then overlap with the following aspect, which covers
serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility
or system. A serious interference with or serious disruption of an electronic
system that is linked with or manages an essential service, facility or system
must also be a serious interference with or disruption of that essential service,
facility or system. According to the principle of minimum legislation, this
aspect should be removed from the proposal.
It is not clear whether the aspect that covers withdrawing a part of the
PRC from its sovereignty or resisting the CPG in its exercise of sovereignty
over a part of China concerns the intention, the act or the consequence of
the offence. From the context, it is likely that this aspect refers to the inten-
tion rather than to the act or the consequence. However, this must be clarified.
Sedition
Although the existing laws include provisions relating to sedition, they were
enacted during colonial rule and adapted to the Hong Kong situation after
74 See p6lObelow.
7 See p 594 above.
76 Consultation document, para 3.7.
7 Sections 9 to 14, Crimes Ordinance. The common law offence of seditious intention is seriously
criticised in that it contravenes the right to free speech. (See Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987), pp 152-160.) Although many countries have retained this offence, it is
seldom used and numerous refinements and qualifications are added. See n 82 below.
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the transfer of sovereignty. The new political and constitutional context is
very different, and the Hong Kong Government agrees that the offence has
to be redrafted to satisfy at least the guiding principles that are listed in the
consultation document. The proposal is that sedition involves inciting oth-
ers to commit the substantive offences of treason, secession or subversion or
to cause violence or public disorder that seriously endangers the stability of
the State or Hong Kong." Incitement is a common law offence" and it means
to seek to influence someone else to commit a crime. To be guilty of the
offence of incitement, there is no requirement that the person so incited
must have carried out the crime. Incitement may be committed by means
of suggestion, persuasion, threats or pressure, by words or by implication.o
The net is still cast too wide." If mere incitement can amount to sedition,
the restriction on freedom of expression will be too excessive, notwithstand-
ing that the consultation document states that the mere expression of views
or reports or commentaries on views or acts of others will not be criminalised.
However, if the law requires that the others so incited must have committed
the act, the person who has incited them might have already committed the
inchoate or accomplice offences of the substantive offence of treason, seces-
sion or subversion. Thus, there is no need to enact laws on sedition. To comply
with the duty to enact laws to prohibit sedition, the law can include an
additional requirement that, on an objective basis, it is highly likely that the
person so incited will commit the substantive offences of treason, secession
or subversion. This suggestion would not require the prosecution to prove
that the person so incited has committed the act, but it does require the pros-
ecution to satisfy an objective test of whether the person who has incited
78 Consultation document, para 4.13.
79 Higgins (1801) 102 ER 269.
80 Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (London: Butterworths, 9th edn, 1999), pp 267-272.
81 Concerning the limits of speech posing threat to the established government, the US Supreme
Court has developed the Brandenburg test: The speech must: (a) advocate the use of force; (b) such
advocacy must be directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and (c) such advocacy
must be likely to incite or produce such action. (See Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444 (1969).) The
European Court of Human Rights has in a series of cases also developed the requirement of incite-
ment to violence in the expression before a limitation could be justified. (See Arslan v Turkey, 8 July
1999, Beskeya and Okguoglu v Turkey, 8 July 1999, Ceylan v Turkey, 8 July 1999, Erdogdu and Ince v
Turkey, 8 July 1999, Gerger v Turkey, 8 July 1999, Karatas v Turkey, 8 July 1999, Oztiirk v Turkey, 8
July 1999, Polar v Turkey, 8 July 1999, Sfirek (No 1) v Turkey, 8 July 1999, Siirek (No 2) v Turkey, 8
July 1999, Siirek (No 3) v Turkey, 8 July 1999, Siirek (No 4) v Turkey, 8 July 1999 and Siirek and
Odemir v Turkey, 8 July 1999.) However, the European Court of Human Rights is less ready to
expressly incorporate the imminence and likelihood requirements in its test as the US Supreme
Court has done, though some judges have suggested similar requirements as adopted by the US
Supreme Court in their judgments (see the judgment of Judge Palm and Judge Bonello in Siirek
(No 1) v Turkey, 8 July 1999).
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others has a good chance of success before he or she is liable. The restriction
of freedom of speech will thus be reduced.82
Principle 6 of the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom
of Expression and Access to Information" provides that expression may be
punished as a threat to national security only if a government can demon-
strate that: (a) the expression is intended to incite imminent violence; (b) it
is likely to incite such violence; and (c) there is a direct and immediate con-
nection between the expression and the likelihood or occurrence of such
violence. The counter-proposal put forward in this article is consistent with
Principle 6 because the intention of the offender, the likely consequence of
the act objectively proved and the causation are all required. The Solicitor
General has argued in a newspaper article" that it is not appropriate to
apply this principle because the law will not be able to cover some situa-
tions85 that should be prohibited. Whether these acts should be prohibited
has to be considered in light of the principle of minimum legislation. If the
Johannesburg Principles or the counter-proposal would provide more protec-
tion for individual rights, then Hong Kong should adopt such an option. 6
Moreover, the content of the incitement should be limited to inciting
others to commit the substantive offences of treason, secession or subversion.
As Article 23 already requires these acts to be prohibited, there is no objec-
tion to incitement to perform them being included in sedition. However,
causing violence or public disorder that seriously endangers the stability of
the State or Hong Kong is not a requirement of Article 23. Article 23 requires
Hong Kong to prohibit acts of sedition, and sedition in Chinese is " 4 #
VAL ". The Chinese term includes "betrayal", " * ". Merely inciting others
82 See the offence of inciting racial hatred under s 18 of the UK Public Order Act. The offence makes
it an alternative for the prosecution to prove either that the accused intended to incite racial
hatred or under all the circumstances racial hatred was likely to have been incited. This indicates
that we can have an objective element in an offence of incitement. Although the Public Order Act
provides that it is an alternative element to intend to incite, the situation in Hong Kong justifies
having it as an additional element. It has already been argued that it is particularly draconian to
impose liability for words or behaviour in the absence of an immediate threat to somebody else (see
David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993), pp 811-814).
83 These Principles were adopted on 1 Oct 1995 by a group of experts in international law, national
security and human rights convened by ARTICLE 19, the International Centre against Censorship,
in collaboration with the Centre for Applied Legal Studies of the University of the Witwatersrand
in Johannesburg. The Principles are based on international and regional law and standards relating
to the protection of human rights, evolving state practice (as reflected, inter alia, in the judgments
of national courts) and the general principles of law that are recognised by the community of
nations.
84 Bob Allcock, "Freedom of expression will not be threatened", Mingpao, 30 Sept 2002 (in Chinese).
85 The examples used are people who incite others to take up arms to prepare for levying war for
secession in the future and people who incite others to interfere with and disrupt the electronic
system of the national defence.
86 This proposal is also very similar to the Brandenburg test adopted by the US Supreme Court referred
to in n 81 above.
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to violence or public disorder that seriously endangers the stability of the
State does not necessarily involve any betrayal, unlike inciting others to
commit treason, secession and subversion. Stability in Hong Kong is clearly
not a matter of concern in relation to Article 23. These acts may well be
covered by the existing public order laws." Even though similar provisions
can be found in other jurisdictions, the principle of minimum legislation would
disallow such legal measures, as Article 23 simply does not require them.
The consultation document also proposes offences concerning seditious
publication." If the act of dealing with seditious publication is part of an act
of incitement, then it may already be punishable as sedition (if the added
objective test is satisfied). Punishing a person who prints, publishes, sells,
offers for sale, distributes, displays, reproduces or imports or exports seditious
publication is, again, not required by Article 23, even when such a person
knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect that the publication, if published,
would be likely to incite others to commit the offence of treason, secession or
subversion. Article 23 requires Hong Kong to prohibit only acts of sedition.
If an act does not amount to sedition by itself, then there is no constitutional
duty to legislate such an offence. The same will apply to the proposed offence
of possession of seditious publications.89
Subversion
Like secession, there is no existing law on subversion. To distinguish it from
treason, subversion covers violent or unlawful acts by internal or domestic
elements threatening the existing constitutional order or the constitution-
ally established government without the involvement of external enemies.90
There is no concept of subversion under common law, though one may argue
that the existing laws on treason which prohibit anyone from committing
any act that aims to overthrow Her Majesty's Government already covers the
offence of subversion. 91
To fulfil its constitutional duty under Article 23, there is a need for the
Hong Kong Government to enact new laws to govern subversion. The con-
sultation document proposes a new offence of subversion. 92 A person commits
such an offence if she, by levying war, the use of force, the threat of force or
other unlawful means, intends to intimidate the PRC Government, to over-
throw the PRC Government or to disestablish the basic system of the State as
established by the PRC Constitution. As argued in the discussion concerning
87 One example is s 19, Public Order Ordinance.
88 Consultation document, para 4.17.
89 Ibid., para 4.18.
90 Ibid., para 2.5.
91 Ibid., para 5.1.
92 Ibid., para 5.5.
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secession above, the principle of minimum legislation will not allow the mere
use of force or threat of force as constituting the act for this offence because
this would criminalise acts that may not have a sufficient degree of
"seriousness"." The meaning of "serious unlawful means" should be amended
in a way similar to that suggested above for secession.9 4 Again, it is unclear
whether intimidating or overthrowing the PRC Government or disestablishing
the basic system of the State is an intention or a consequence. There should
be an intention to support any act of subversion as in the case of the secession
offences," and this needs to be clarified.
Theft of Official Secrets
Article 23 requires Hong Kong to enact laws to prohibit the theft of state secrets.
Offences that concern state secrets are already covered by the Official Secrets
Ordinance (OSO).6 However, the OSO covers government secrets as well as
state secrets. It does not only prohibit theft of official secrets, but also the un-
lawful disclosure of such secrets. The OSO was originally enacted to localise
the Official Secrets Acts97 (which was applicable to colonial Hong Kong), but
it has now been seen as legislation to implement Article 23. If the principle of
minimum legislation is applied, then many provisions in the OSO may not be
needed. If theft of state secrets alone has to be prohibited under Article 23,
what is needed will only be those provisions on spying and related provisions in
the OSO. The whole set of provisions concerning unlawful disclosure of pro-
tected information are not needed, or at least not to fulfil the requirement of
Article 23, because they are either not related to theft or they are not related to
state secrets or even secrets. A different justification will have to be provided
for the provisions and Article 23 should not be used as the constitutional basis
for those provisions prohibiting unlawful disclosure.
It is agreed that the "theft" of state secrets cannot be understood in the
same sense as the theft of personal property, because in respect of state secrets
there is often no permanent deprivation of information." The meaning of
"theft" can only include unauthorised access to, transmission of or dealing
with protected information as suggested by the consultation document."
However, if unauthorised disclosure of the protected information is included
within the meaning of "theft", then the concept may be stretched too far.
9 See pp 595 - 596 above.
94 See p 596 above.
95 See p 596 above.
96 Cap 521.
97 1911, 1920 and 1989, United Kingdom.
98 Consultation document, para 6.20.
99 Ibid., para 6.21.
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One may have stolen certain information according to the above meaning
without disclosing it, though in most situations the theft is for the purpose of
disclosing the information to some person. If disclosure has to be included,
the disclosure must be limited to disclosure to an enemy. If disclosure in other
contexts is also covered, such as disclosure to embarrass the Hong Kong
government, it would not be within the requirement of Article 23. Article 23
states that a series of acts including treason, secession, sedition, subversion
and the theft of state secrets have to be prohibited. The other four offences
are much more serious than mere disclosure of government information. If
"theft of states secrets" is read widely to include unlawful disclosure, then it
would contravene the legislative intent of Article 23.
Concerning the spying provisions in the OSO, the consultation docu-
ment proposes that the information to be protected should include that
which is likely to be useful to an enemy and is obtained or disclosed for a
purpose that is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or Hong
Kong. This is compatible with the principle of minimum legislation, except
that it does not need to include the disclosure of information for a purpose
that is prejudicial to the safety of Hong Kong. Article 23 only requires the
protection of state secrets and state interests.
The prohibited acts under the spying provisions in the OSO include acts
that are not directly acts of obtaining or attempting to obtain information.
Most of these related provisions (such as harbouring..o or the unauthorised
use of uniform) 01 may be concrete examples of the inchoate or accomplice
acts of the substantial offence. However, some of the related offences pro-
.hibit acts that may not even constitute an attempt. A general rule that should
be applied in reviewing these offences is that if the prohibited act under those
spying provisions is already covered by the inchoate or accomplice acts or
the direct acts of obtaining information, then the offence is acceptable under
the principle of minimum legislation."' An offence that prohibits acts which
could not fall under the inchoate acts or accomplice acts of the offence of
obtaining information should not be accepted (unless the Hong Kong Gov-
ernment can find a justification other than Article 23 to support them).
The spying provisions also include provisions that concern the prosecu-
tion of the offences. The accused is placed in a very disadvantaged position,
and many presumptions against the accused are included. 0 3 These prejudices
against the accused in persecution cannot be found in other Article 23 offences.
The inconsistency in evidential proof cannot be justified, because all of the
100 Section 4, 0SO.
101 Section 5, 0SO.
102 See p 610 below.
103 Section 3(3), (4) and (5), OSO.
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offences are Article 23 offences. If such prejudices are not found in the of-
fences of treason, secession, sedition and subversion, they should also not
be applicable to the theft of state secrets.
Under the unlawful disclosure provisions in the OSO, it is an offence for
members of security and intelligence services to disclose without lawful au-
thority any information, document or other article that relates to security
or intelligence which is or has been in their possession by virtue of their
position as a member of any of those services.I The information involved
may be state secrets, but unlawful disclosure does not necessarily involve any
act of theft. This may be justified, but the constitutional basis should not be
Article 23.
It is also an offence for a public servant or a government contractor to
make damaging disclosures of information relating to security, intelligence
or defence, international relationships or the commission of offences and
criminal investigations."os Information that relates to security, intelligence
or defence and international relationships may include state secrets, but
again the act does not need to involve theft. A similar conclusion therefore
applies. Information that is related to the commission of offences and crimi-
nal investigations are clearly not state secrets. The same applies to information
that relates to relations between the Central Authorities and Hong Kong,
which the Hong Kong Government would like to add to the list of informa-
tion that is protected from unlawful disclosure. The prohibition of disclosure
is not absolute, and it will only be an offence if the disclosure is "damaging."
If something can be lawfully disclosed, then it is difficult to call it "secret".
These provisions are not required by Article 23 and should be deleted unless
the government can offer some other legal or constitutional justifications. A
civil servant may not be able to assert any free speech right as a speaker.
However, the free speech right that can be invoked is the right of the public
to receive as much information as possible to enable them to contribute ef-
fectively to political debate.'06
Another proposal is to make unauthorised and damaging disclosure of
protected information that was obtained through unauthorised access unlaw-
ful.107 One uncertainty of this proposal is that it is not clear whether there is
104 Section 13, OSO.
105 Section 14 to 18, OSO.
106 Barendt (n 77 above). Under s 15 of the Canadian Security of Information Act, a limited defence
of public interest is available to civil servants or government contractors if the disclosure is about
the commission of a statutory offence by another government official and the public interest in the
disclosure outweighs the public interest in non-disclosure.
107 It is not clear from the consultation document whether unauthorised access to such protected
information is also to be made unlawful under the OSO if the access is not for a purpose prejudicial
to the safety or interests of the State. The proposal only states that the unauthorised and damaging
disclosure of protected information will be unlawful.
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any territorial requirement on the act of obtaining through unauthorised
access. It is not clear whether the act of obtaining through unauthorised ac-
cess must be done in Hong Kong. There is no question that the act of disclosure
can be in Hong Kong or overseas.'" The existing offences cover disclosure of
protected information from a public servant or a government contractor in
Hong Kong. The information that they may disclose or leak to others would
most likely be in Hong Kong. The act of obtaining the information would
also be in Hong Kong. If the proposal is aiming at plugging a "loophole"
rather then extending the scope of application of the existing laws, "o the act
of obtaining the protected information through unauthorised access must be
limited to an act committed in Hong Kong. If a person obtains the protected
information in the mainland, but discloses the information in Hong Kong,
he should not be liable under Hong Kong law.'10 Moreover, this proposal
should also be objected to on the ground that it has no relationship with the
implementation of Article 23. If the Hong Kong Government believes that
there is justification for making such laws, then it should propose it in an-
other legislative exercise, rather than mixing non-constitutional legislative
measures with constitutional ones.
Foreign Political Organisations
Article 23 requires that foreign political organisations or bodies should be
prohibited from conducting political activities in Hong Kong, and political
organisations or bodies of Hong Kong should be prohibited from establishing
ties with foreign political organisations or bodies. These requirements are
fulfilled by the Societies Ordinance,"' but the consultation document pro-
poses to establish an additional proscription mechanism to prevent foreign
political organisations from conducting political activities in Hong Kong or
establishing ties with local political organisations that are harmful to national
security or unity."2 According to the consultation document, the power to
proscribe will only be exercised by the Secretary for Security if the objective,
or one of the objectives, of the organisation is to engage in any act of treason,
secession, sedition, subversion or theft of state secrets, or if the organisation
has committed or is attempting to commit any act of treason, secession,
sedition, subversion or theft of state secrets, or the organisation is affiliated
with a mainland organisation that has been affiliated with another mainland
organisation which has been proscribed in the Mainland by the Central
1os Consultation document, para 6.26.
109 Ibid., para 6.22.
110 It is unclear whether a person is liable if he hacks into a mainland electronic system from a com-
puter in Hong Kong and obtains the protected information.
III Cap 151.
112 Consultation document, para 7.2.
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Authorities, in accordance with national law, on the ground that it endangers
national security."'
The Hong Kong Government has already accepted that existing laws
allow a Societies Officer, after consultation with the Secretary for Security,
to refuse an application for registration to be a society 14 or cancel the re-
gistration of a society"' if he reasonably believes that the refusal or the
cancellation is necessary in the interests of national security"' or if the
society is a political body that has a connection with a foreign political
organisation"I or a political organisation of Taiwan."' If a society continues
to operate after its application for registration has been refused or its regis-
tration has been cancelled, then every office bearer of the society commits an
offence.119
Existing law also empowers the Secretary for Security, on the recommen-
dation of a Societies Officer, to make an order prohibiting the operation or
continued operation of a society if he reasonably believes that the prohibi-
tion of the operation or continued operation of a society or a branch is necessary
in the interests of national security or if the society or the branch is a political
body that has a connection with a foreign political organisation or a political
organisation of Taiwan.120 Such a society will become an unlawful society.12'
Any office bearer of and any person managing any unlawful society is guilty
of an offence.'22
The kinds of societies or organisations that may be covered by the pro-
posed new proscription mechanism include those that are operating in a
manner contravening the proscribed situations from the date of its establish-
ment or after its establishment. It is very unlikely that a society or an
organisation that operates in a manner contravening the proscribed situa-
tions from the date of its establishment will apply to be registered under the
Societies Ordinance. However, the office bearers of such a society or
organisation can be punished for failing to register it.'23
113 Ibid., para 7.15.
114 Section 5A(3), Societies Ordinance.
115 Section 5D, Societies Ordinance.
116 This means the safeguarding of the territorial integrity and the independence of the PRC. See s 2,
Societies Ordinance.
117 This includes a government of a foreign country or a political subdivision of a government of a
foreign country; an agent of a government of a foreign country or an agent of a political subdivision
of the government of a foreign country; or a political party in a foreign country or its agent. See s 2,
Societies Ordinance.
118 This includes the administration of Taiwan or a political subdivision of that administration; an
agent of the administration of Taiwan or an agent of a political subdivision of the administration; or
a political party in Taiwan or its agent. See s 2, Societies Ordinance.
119 Section 5F, Societies Ordinance.
120 Section 8, Societies Ordinance.
121 Section 18, Societies Ordinance.
122 Section 19, Societies Ordinance.
123 Section SC, Societies Ordinance.
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If the society or organisation operates in a manner contravening the
proscribed situations after its establishment, it is likely that it is already a
registered society. Such a society can then be prohibited from operation
under the existing laws. If the situations covered by the proscription system
can already be covered by existing laws then, under the principle of mini-
mum legislation, there is no need to establish another proscription mechanism.
Even if it is accepted that the Secretary for Security could have this power,
the conditions for exercising it and the possible consequences still need to be
carefully studied. Article 27 of the Basic Law protects the freedom of associa-
tion of Hong Kong people. Such a right is also protected under Article 22 of
the ICCPR. While a law requiring a body of persons to register in order to
obtain legal personality is compatible with the right to freedom of association,
such a registration process must not nullify the exercise of the right by setting
requirements that are unreasonably onerous, either in terms of the quantity
of information or the type of disclosure required.124 Associations should be
free to maintain contact or affiliation with associations in other countries or
international bodies.125 The right can be subject to restrictions that are pre-
scribed by and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, but the limitation must be interpreted cautiously so as to narrow the
scope for governments to invoke it.126
The first two conditions seem to be justified because acts of treason,
secession, sedition, subversion and the theft of state secrets are prohibited by
Article 23. If an organisation has such an objective, then the preventative
measure of proscribing it is reasonable (although it is very unlikely that the
society's registration would have been allowed to begin with). If an organisation
has committed or is attempting to commit those prohibited acts, most likely
its officers or some of its members who are directly involved in those acts
would be prosecuted under the relevant laws.
The biggest problem is the condition that an organisation in Hong Kong
may be proscribed if it is affiliated with a mainland organisation that has been
proscribed by the mainland authorities in accordance with national law on
the ground that it endangers national security. This condition will allow
mainland laws to be indirectly applicable to Hong Kong. This is against the
principle of minimum legislation as well as the autonomy of Hong Kong. It
124 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, The Neglected Right: Freedom of Association in International
Human Rights Law (United States: LCHR, 1997). See also Lavisse v France, Appl. No 14223/88,
Decisions and Reports, Vol 70 at 218-239.
125 Art 5 of the International Labour Convention No 87 guarantees the right of trade unions to affili-
ate with international organisations of workers and employers.
126 It has been suggested that there is no right to associate for a purpose that is illegal in national law,
but there is serious doubt whether this is the correct approach. See Harris, Boyle and Warbrick, Law
of the European Convention on Human Rights (London: Butterworths, 1995), p 420.
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is unclear on what legal basis mainland organisations will be proscribed by
the mainland authorities on the ground of national security. The criteria and
procedures the mainland authorities will apply is unknown. According to
Article 23 of the PRC Law on National Security, 127 any person or organisation
that commits any act that violates the national security of the PRC will be
criminally liable. There is no specific rule for the proscription of an organisation
on the ground of national security in the law. The Implementation Rules of
the Law on National Securityl28 also do not include a specific proscription
system. Articles 102 to 113 of the Criminal Law of the PRC129 establish vari-
ous offences on crimes endangering national security. Again, these provisions
impose criminal liability on individuals and organisations but no proscrip-
tion mechanism is established. A proscription system for cults can be found
under the Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress on the Ban of Cults and Prevention and Punishment of Cult
Activities.' The resolution was passed to supplement Article 300 of the
Criminal Law of the PRC concerning offences by cults. In the future, a simi-
lar resolution may be passed to deal with organisations that are involved in
crimes against national security. However, there is no existing law to authorise
proscription of organisations in the Mainland on the ground of national
security. Even for the proscription of cults in the Mainland, it is unclear what
organisations will be proscribed and what procedures will be followed when
an organisation is proscribed under the resolution."' Thus the mainland au-
thorities could proscribe all kinds of organisations in China, from underground
churches to social clubs, NGOs or political groups, on the ground of national
security.
Following this arrangement, an organisation in Hong Kong may be sub-
ject to a proscription order merely because it maintains an affiliation with
a mainland organisation without committing any other unlawful acts. The
restriction imposed on the Hong Kong organisation's right to freedom of
association is much more than necessary in a democratic society.
Regardless of the definition and procedure, a decision on the basis of such
national laws will be made indirectly applicable to Hong Kong because any
organisation in Hong Kong affiliated to that organisation will also be pro-
scribed in Hong Kong. The consultation document does not define affiliation.
127 Adopted by the 30th Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Con-
gress on 22 Feb 1993.
128 Enacted by the State Council to implement the Law on 10 May 1994.
129 Adopted by the 2nd Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on 1 July 1979 and amended
by the 5th Session of the Eighth National People's Congress on 14 Mar 1997.
130 Passed by the Ninth National People's Congress on 30 Oct 1999.
131 See the Explanations of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on the
Application of Law Concerning Crimes Involved in the Organisation and Utilization of Cults
passed on 9 Oct 1999 and 8 Oct 1999.
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There is also doubt about whether an organisation in Hong Kong could be
proscribed by the central authorities directly on the ground of national security.
Presumably, the Secretary of Security would have to proscribe that organisation
in Hong Kong. The impact of the national law might be even more direct.
To avoid these situations from arising, the first two conditions only should
be implemented. An organisation in Hong Kong, regardless of any possible
affiliation to a proscribed organisation in the Mainland, that has committed
or is attempting to commit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion
or theft of state secrets, can already be proscribed in Hong Kong. Affiliation
by itself is not an act to be prohibited under Article 23. Such affiliation does
not necessarily cause an organisation in Hong Kong to commit prohibited
acts. As the standards for these prohibited acts in Hong Kong are very differ-
ent from the Mainland, it is totally undesirable that a Hong Kong organisation
could be proscribed only on the basis of affiliation.
In addition, the proposed proscription has a very wide impact. 13 2 It affects
the office bearers of the organisation, its members, any person who supports it
and any organisation that has a connection with it. The consultation docu-
ment proposes to make it an offence for persons to organise or support the
activities of a proscribed organisation. 3 1 Such support includes being a mem-
ber of, providing financial assistance, other property or facilitation to, and
carrying out the policies and directives of the proscribed organisation. The
Secretary of Security may also declare an organisation unlawful if it has a
connection with a proscribed organisation."I A connection is defined as in-
cluding solicitation or acceptance by the association of financial contributions,
financial sponsorships or financial support of any kind or loans from a pro-
scribed organisation, or vice versa; affiliation with a proscribed organisation,
or vice versa; determination of the association's policies by a proscribed
organisation, or vice versa; or direction, dictation, control or participation in
the association's decision making process by a proscribed organisation, or vice
versa.
The difference between an organisation being proscribed by the Secretary
of Security and an organisation being declared unlawful in such a manner is
still not clear. It is assumed that persons who organise or support activities
of a proscribed organisation will only be liable for the offence after the
organisation has been proscribed. If not, it would be a clear breach of the
right against retrospective criminal liability.' If there is already a list of
132 This may mean that proscription is different from a prohibition under existing laws. However,
following the principle of minimum legislation, this new proscription mechanism may not be justi-
fied as it imposes more restrictions on individual rights and freedoms.
133 Consultation document, para 7.14.
134 Ibid., para 7.17.
135 Art 15, ICCPR.
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inchoate or accomplice offences for the prohibited acts, then such people
could be punished for committing those acts."' If what they have done does
not constitute an inchoate or accomplice act of the prohibited acts, then why
should they be punished? A member of a proscribed organisation may have
no relationship with the acts that are committed by the office bearers or other
members of the organisation. This goes against the principle of minimum
legislation.
Investigation Powers
The consultation document proposes that special powers which have already
been granted to the police to investigate some of the prohibited acts under
the existing laws should be retained. It is argued that additional powers
should also be granted to the police to enforce the offences under Article 23.
The issue is whether under the principle of minimum legislation special pow-
ers need to be given to the police to enforce these offences, regardless of
whether they are under existing laws or newly added provisions.
There are usually several reasons to justify special powers for police. First,
there is an imminent danger of widespread contravention of the offence in
question. Second, the offence is of such a serious nature that society should
use all measures, even at the cost of individual rights, to suppress them before
their occurrence. Third, there is a genuine difficulty in investigation, collect-
ing evidence and prosecuting the offender. However, due to the possible
infringement of individual rights, special powers should only be allowed in
very exceptional situations, and they must be well justified.
The power proposed to be retained'3 1 is the power of a police officer to
enter any premises or place, or stop and board any vehicle to remove or
obliterate any seditious publication.'3 1 Under the existing laws, this power
should not be exercised without a warrant if the seditious publication is not
visible from a public place. The consultation document proposes to restrict
this power to enter and remove the seditious publication without a warrant
only in cases of great emergency. The consultation document is not very
clear about whether seditious publications will be seized. As the Hong Kong
Government proposes to create an offence of dealing with seditious publi-
cations and retain the offence of the possession of a seditious publication,
presumably it will also retain the existing provision that allows seditious pub-
lications be seized and disposed of as the court may direct."'
136 See p 610 below.
137 Consultation document, para 8.3.
138 Section 14(1), Crimes Ordinance.
139 Section 14(4), Crimes Ordinance.
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It is doubtful that a seditious publication should be seized if the mere deal-
ing in or possession of seditious publications is not an offence. If a seditious
publication is involved in the commission of the act of sedition, the publica-
tion should be seized and disposed of as property that has been used in the
commission of an offence.' However, the power to be retained is a power
to search for all seditious publications, even though they will not be seized
together with an offender. This is not necessary according to the principle
of minimum legislation and if the power to seize cannot be retained then
the power to enter and seize, or the power to enter and seize with or without
warrant and under whatever conditions, cannot be retained.
An additional power that is suggested in the consultation document is to
authorise the police to enter private premises without warrants in emergen-
cies for investigations."' It is proposed that the power can only be exercised
by a superintendent when he reasonably believes that a relevant offence has
been committed or is being committed; evidence of substantial value will
be lost if no immediate action is taken and the investigation of the relevant
offence will be seriously prejudiced as a result. The Commissioner of Police
in cases of exceptional emergency and in the interest of national security or
public safety may require a bank to disclose to him information that is rel-
evant to the investigation where there is reasonable suspicion that the relevant
offence has been committed or is being committed. It is also suggested that
offences under Article 23 should be included under the Serious Crimes
Ordinance, 14 2 and such inclusion will afford additional powers for dealing
with the offences.143 These additional powers include the power for the
Secretary for Justice to make an ex parte application to the Court of First
Instance for an order to require a person to answer questions or furnish mate-
rial that reasonably appears to be relevant to an investigation (ie a witness
order) or to produce or to grant access to materials that are specified in an
order that is likely to be relevant to an investigation (ie a production order).
An authorised officer may also make an application to the Court of First
Instance or the District Court for a warrant to search specified premises for
the purpose of an investigation when the witness order or production order is
not complied with.
The offences under Article 23 are of a serious nature, but at present in
Hong Kong there is no imminent danger of widespread contravention. The
Hong Kong Government has not proven that there are genuine difficulties in
investigating, collecting evidence and prosecuting offenders of the Article 23
140 Section 102, Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap 221).
141 Consultation document, para 8.5.
142 Cap 455.
143 Consultation document, para 8.7.
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offences. Therefore, these special powers are not compatible with the prin-
ciple of minimum legislation.
Unlawful Drilling
The consultation document proposes 44 to retain the offence to punish the
trainers and trainees in any unauthorised training in the use of arms or mili-
tary exercise.'45 However, if the training is linked with any offence under
Article 23, it should already be caught by the inchoate or accomplices acts
of the substantial offences.146 Hence, there is no special need to retain the
offence according to the principle of minimum legislation.
Inchoate or Accomplice Offences
The consultation document proposes to create statutory offences for incho-
ate and accomplice acts including attempting, conspiring, aiding and abetting,
counselling and procuring the commission of the substantive offences of
treason, secession and subversion under Article 23. Sedition covers the in-
choate offences of incitement of the substantial offences of treason, secession
and subversion. 47
Whether these inchoate and accomplice offences are acceptable under
the principle of minimum legislation must be considered from an holistic
perspective. The inchoate and accomplice acts are partly common law and
partly statutory creations,148 and they apply to all crimes. As they are already
covered by existing laws there may not be a need to legislate new statutory
offences according to the principle of minimum legislation. However, the
provisions are scattered through several pieces of legislation, and it may also
be consistent with the principle to codify them specifically for the offences
under Article 23 on the condition that the new statutory offences only
systematise and clarify the existing laws. As illustrated above, if these incho-
ate and accomplice offences for all of the offences under Article 23 are created,
many of the proposals in the consultation document will not be needed be-
cause they either are already covered by the inchoate and accomplice offences
or these offences will impose less restriction on individual freedoms than the
proposals. 149
One interesting point is that the consultation document only proposes to
create new statutory offences on the inchoate and accomplice acts for treason,
144 Ibid., Para 9.3.
145 Section 18, Crimes Ordinance.
146 See "Inchoate or Accomplice Offences" below.
17 Consultation document, para 2.13.
148 Section 159A, Crimes Ordinance (conspiracy); s 159G to 159K, Crimes Ordinance (attempt) and
s 89, Criminal Procedure Ordinance (aiding and abetting, counselling and procuring).
19 See the discussion of treason, secession, sedition, theft of state secrets, the affiliation of organisations
in Hong Kong with mainland organisations and unlawful drilling above.
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secession and subversion. No proposal has been made concerning inchoate or
accomplice offences for sedition. Does this mean that it will not be an offence
to attempt, conspire, aid, abet, counsel or procure to incite under the sedition
offence, or would the general legal scheme"o under the existing laws be still
applicable?"' If the general legal scheme on inchoate and accomplice of-
fences is applicable to sedition, then why do specific statutory offences for the
inchoate and accomplice acts of the substantive offences of treason, secession
and subversion need to'be created?
Related to this question is whether the general legal scheme on inchoate
and accomplice offences will also be applicable to the new statutory offences
on the inchoate and accomplice acts of the substantial offences of treason,
secession and subversion.152 One consideration that must be looked at is the
legal significance of creating statutory offences for inchoate and accomplice
acts of the substantial offences of treason, secession and subversion. If these
newly created inchoate and accomplice offences are considered to be sub-
stantial offences on their own, then there is a much stronger argument to
make all of the above double inchoate and accomplice acts unlawful. Then,
attempting to conspire, attempting to aid, abet, counsel or procure,'53 con-
spiring to aid, abet, counsel or procure or aiding, abetting, counselling or
procuring someone to attempt"' to commit the substantive offences of treason,
secession and subversion will be unlawful. The result is that liability might be
put too far back. It may not be the intention of the Hong Kong Government
to create such statutory offences.
Moreover, is it an offence to incite a person to attempt"' or to conspirel56
or to aid, abet, counsel and procure another person"' to commit treason,
secession or subversion? It seems that the consultation document does not
intend these to be unlawful, as the person to be liable must have actually
incited another person to commit the substantial offences of treason,
150 See n 148 above.
151 There may even be the possibility of inciting someone to incite. See Glanville Williams, Textbook of
Criminal Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 2nd edn, 1983), pp 443-444.
152 We may call this double inchoate or accomplice liability.
153 See s 159G(5), Crimes Ordinance. However, if the statutory offences of the inchoate and accom-
plice acts of the substantial offences of treason, secession and subversion are taken as substantial
offences themselves, then it may still be possible that it is an offence.
154 Dunnington (1984) QB 472.
155 There may not be a need to have this offence, as inciting a person to attempt to commit an offence
almost inevitably involves inciting the person to commit the substantial offence.
156 Under existing laws, it is unlawful for someone to incite another to conspire to commit an offence.
157 Under existing laws, if the offence is a substantial offence such as s 33B of the Offences Against the
Person Ordinance (Cap 212), which makes it an offence to aid, abet, counsel or procure another to
commit or attempt to commit suicide, then it is possible that a person will be convicted for inciting
someone to aid, abet, counsel and procure that offence. If not, then as aiding, abetting, counselling
and procuring is not an offence by itself, inciting the commission of these accomplice acts is not an
offence.
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secession and subversion. This may also be evidence that the Hong Kong
Government does not want the general legal scheme on inchoate and ac-
complice offences to be applicable to all of the offences, substantive as well as
inchoate and accomplice, under Article 23.
Application
The consultation document proposes that the treason offences, secession
offences, subversion and sedition are applicable to all persons who are volun-
tarily in Hong Kong for acts that are committed in Hong Kong and to HKSAR
permanent residents for acts that are committed outside Hong Kong. Other
persons may also commit the secession offences for acts outside Hong Kong if
such actions are linked to Hong Kong either under common law or as set out
in the Criminal Jurisdiction Ordinance.I For the offence of sedition, if the
person intends in the incitement that the offence of treason, secession or
subversion be committed in Hong Kongl59 then they are also liable.
All of these rules are either based on common law or existing laws that are
applicable to all other crimes. Therefore, they are compatible with the prin-
ciple of minimum legislation.
Conclusion
The benefit of the doubt may be given to the Hong Kong Government that
the consultation document is a sincere attempt to fulfil its constitutional duty
under the Basic Law. The Government does not regard the implementation
of Article 23 as its only constitutional duty. In the consultation document,
it expressly states that it also has the duty to implement other relevant pro-
visions of Chapter III of the Basic Law, particularly Articles 27 and 39,160
158 Cap 461. The consultation document summarises that Hong Kong courts have jurisdiction over
offences in the following cases: (a) if any of the conduct (including an omission) or part of the
results that are required to be proved for conviction of the offence takes place in Hong Kong; (b) if
there has been an attempt to commit the offence in Hong Kong, whether or not the attempt was
made in Hong Kong or elsewhere and irrespective of whether it had an effect in Hong Kong; (c) if
there has been an attempt or incitement in Hong Kong to commit the offence elsewhere; (d) if
there has been a conspiracy to commit in Hong Kong the offence wherever the conspiracy is formed
and whether or not anything is done in Hong Kong to further or advance the conspiracy; or (e) if
there has been a conspiracy in Hong Kong to do elsewhere that which if done in Hong Kong would
constitute the offence, provided that the intended conduct was an offence in the jurisdiction where
the object was intended to be carried out.
159 This part of the consultation document is rather unclear as it uses the following terms: "in the
case of other persons Hong Kong should have jurisdiction over extra-territorial conduct only if it
is intended or likely to incite the offence of treason, secession or subversion, or incite violence or
public disorder as described in paragraph 4.13, in Hong Kong...". What is unclear is the meaning
of "intended or likely to" and to what "likely to" refers. Is it referring to what is intended? (ie
someone intends the offence to be likely to be committed in Hong Kong). Is it referring to the
intention itself? (ie it is likely that the person intends the offence to be committed in Hong Kong).
160 Consultation document, para 1.7(a).
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both of which are related to the protection of fundamental rights and free-
doms of the people of Hong Kong. According to Article 23, Hong Kong has
the duty to enact laws to prohibit the listed acts, and such a duty was pre-
sumably active when the Basic Law came into force on 1 July 1997. The Hong
Kong Government has tried very hard to delay the legislation to implement
Article 23. Again, the Government can be given the benefit of the doubt
that its strategy to delay the legislation was not merely out of its own interest
or the interest of the CPG. The Hong Kong Government has tried to find the
best time to initiate the legislative process to implement Article 23.
The Hong Kong Government has also tried to strike what it considers to
be the proper balance between two conflicting values: (a) the State's essen-
tial interests of sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and national security;
and (b) the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong.
There is much improvement in the attitude of the Hong Kong Government
towards human rights protection and this is reflected in the consultation
document when it is compared with the past record of the Hong Kong
Government.'
When the Hong Kong Government first released the consultation
document, legal professional bodies and human rights activists were caught
unprepared, because the document seemed to be much more liberal than they
expected. However, from more detailed analysis, there are still some prob-
lems in the Government's attitude towards human rights protection. First,
the Government wants to satisfy the international standard on the protec-
tion of human rights in fulfilling its constitutional duty under Article 23, but
,it only tries to satisfy the lowest requirement. There are more expansive op-
tions on human rights protection, but it seems that the Hong Kong
Government has no intention of adopting them. Second, rather than consid-
ering the specific needs of Hong Kong on human rights protection, the Hong
Kong Government only refers to the English common law rules, the existing
laws or laws in other Western liberal States to support its proposals. Such
rules and laws only reflect the needs of those States at the time when the
rules or laws were made. This approach may not be appropriate for dealing
with human rights protection in Hong Kong, which has a very different po-
litical and constitutional setting. Third, the Hong Kong Government seems
to be using this opportunity to achieve many objectives162 other than just to
implement Article 23. Such ulterior motives may cause people to question
the sincerity of the Hong Kong Government in this legislative exercise.
161 Tai (n 14 above).
162 One example is the proposal to create a new offence in the OSO prohibiting unauthorised and
damaging disclosure of protected information that was obtained directly or indirectly by unauthorised
access to it. The consultation document expressly states that this proposal is to deal with a loophole
in the OSO, but that is not necessary in fulfilling the duty under Art 23. See p 602 above.
Vol 32 Part 3 The Principle of Minimum Legislation 613
HeinOnline -- 32 Hong Kong L.J. 613 2002
The Hong Kong Government must review its constitutional position in
the existing constitutional order of Hong Kong. Because it is not a directly
elected government, what it lacks is legitimacy and trust. The proposals in
the consultation document do not do enough for the Hong Kong Govern-
ment to rebuild a trust relationship between the Government and the people
of Hong Kong. Only with such trust can the Government reclaim its legiti-
macy in ruling Hong Kong. Without such legitimacy, it will be very difficult
for the Government to lead Hong Kong society in dealing with the difficult
problems, both economic and social, that Hong Kong is encountering.
If the Hong Kong Government insists on using the proposals in the con-
sultation document to implement Article 23, it should not have much difficulty
in having those proposals passed as laws by the Legislative Council according
to its own timeframe. It is true that if the Hong Kong Government adopts
this strategy, the result may not be very damaging because the trust of the
people in the Government is already at a very low level. However, the Hong
Kong Government will miss a golden opportunity to rebuild trust and reassert
its legitimacy to rule Hong Kong.
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